Firms must overcome agency and information asymmetry problems to make efficient capital budgeting decisions; this is particularly true for firms with multiple units dispersed across geographic locations. Internal communication and coordination may therefore be crucial in reducing information asymmetry and achieving efficient resource allocation. We examine the relationship between capital budgeting decisions and the degree of internal information sharing using a dataset of 342 U.S. firms from 1993 to 2002. We observe a strong, significant relationship between value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions and stronger internal linkages. Specifically, the likelihood of excessive investments is significantly reduced with better information sharing across units.
INTRODUCTION
There are many reasons why firms may not invest at optimal levels. Firms with more agency and informational asymmetry problems, for example, make less efficient capital budgeting decisions (Durnev et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2006) . Information asymmetry problems may be particularly acute for large multi-unit organizations, which are often geographically dispersed and managed with relative autonomy. In such circumstances, under-or overinvestment by the firm may result from inefficient communication and coordination across various subsidiaries. On the one hand, if complementary assets inside the firm are not properly utilized, valuable investment opportunities may be overlooked. On the other hand, repetitive or inefficient investments may occur when managers are unaware of resources available in other parts of the organization. This is especially true for firms with high levels of intangible assets, where the ability to combine and recombine existing knowledge may represent the firms' key competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) . In this paper, we examine whether efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions are associated with intra-firm coordination and collaboration, after controlling for other relevant firm characteristics. A sample of 342 U.S. manufacturing firms from 1993 to 2002 is used. We expect that, ceteris paribus, firms with more internal information sharing are more likely to make efficient corporate budgeting decisions, and the relationship should be more striking in organizations dispersed across many locations.
Efficiency of capital budgeting decisions is examined from the perspective of firm value maximization, using marginal Tobin's q, the ratio of the marginal change in market value to the contemporaneous marginal change in assets. The deviation of a firm's estimated marginal q from moderated by the number of locations where the firm has R&D activities. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical rationale for a relationship between efficient capital budgeting and internal information sharing. The measures of investment efficiency and internal coordination are outlined in Section 3. The data and econometric methods are described in Section 4. In Section 5 we present and analyze the empirical results and their implications. In Section 6 we present and analyze robustness tests using average Q as the dependent variable. Section 7 concludes.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Firm Organization and Informational Asymmetry
Firms that face agency and informational asymmetry problems make less-efficient capital budgeting decisions (Durnev et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2006) due to both intra-firm and interfirm conditions. Internally, to make value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions, managers must possess sufficient information about the organization, and their interests must be aligned with those of the shareholders. Externally, to the extent that investors perceive there to be agency or informational asymmetry problems, financing might be priced at a premium (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . The resultant liquidity constraint could cause a firm to reduce the scale of its investment activity (Himmelberg et al., 2002) . Such concerns are particularly important for geographically diversified firms, which tend to have more complex organizational structures and present greater agency and information asymmetry problems to managers and investors (e.g., Graham et al., 2002) .
While diversified firms in general may face greater challenges in internal communication and coordination, some of them possess unique organizational capabilities that enable them to make more effective investment decisions (e.g., Villalonga, 2004; Greene et al., 2006) . Some diversified firms have better management practices, which would be consistent with their stronger corporate performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007a, 2007b) . Firm heterogeneity may thus be important to our understanding of complex organizations.
Multinational firms have long been recognized as a dispersed innovation network, with the capacity to assimilate, generate, and integrate knowledge on a global basis (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1990) . Firms also frequently adjust their internal allocation of resources depending on the local environments. For example, Desai et al. (2004) suggest that multinational firms appear to increase their internal borrowing in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak creditor rights. Based on a large sample of U.S.-headquartered multinational firms, Feinberg and Gupta (2006) find strong evidence that firms respond to high risks in the host countries by increasing the extent of internal transactions among subsidiaries.
Finally, Greene et al. (2006) observe that more efficient capital budgeting is strongly associated with multinationality, even after controlling for firm and location characteristics. In this study, we examine whether the efficiency of firms' capital budgeting decisions is associated with the coordination mechanisms that allow firms to alleviate agency or information asymmetry problems.
Coordination and Internal Information Sharing
In a large, dispersed organization, various units are often exposed to idiosyncratic challenges and opportunities in their respective industries or geographic locations. They often have their own agenda and interests, which may or may not be consistent with the firm's overall strategic goals. Firms therefore have reason to establish various formal and informal channels for internal coordination (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) so as to reduce coordination barriers and any related dissonance within the firm. This is crucial for efficient corporate capital budgeting, which requires managers to use resources effectively at the organization level. Given the intangible nature of information sharing, it is almost impossible to capture the full spectrum of intra-firm communication and coordination.
However, for firms that engage in active innovation, their patenting activities leave a valuable "paper trail" which can be used to examine the otherwise invisible internal linkages (Jaffe et al., 2000) . Because many firms are simultaneously conducting R&D in multiple locales, and innovation is increasingly important for marketplace competition, we believe that information sharing in firms' R&D activities may be a good representation of the overall levels of communication and coordination inside the corporation.
One mechanism of internal information sharing is knowledge flows inside the organization, especially across units or geographic locations. Hall et al. (2005) suggest that internalized knowledge transfers can lead to corporate competitive advantage and thus higher firm value.
Firms with good coordination mechanisms should be able to identify and build on internal technologies better and faster than competitors. For example, Zhao (2006) suggests that the ability to integrate internal technologies enables multinational firms to appropriate value from R&D even in countries with weak intellectual property rights protection. Similar findings have been identified for firms conducting R&D in highly competitive technology clusters (Alcácer and Zhao, 2007) .
The second mechanism that we identify is interpersonal collaboration. Despite the development of information technologies, knowledge spillovers remain locally constrained (Jaffe et al., 1993) ; even knowledge transfer inside the firm boundary has proved to be challenging without the right mechanisms in place (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996) . Interpersonal relationships have long been considered an important mechanism of information sharing. the external environment. Similarly, Lahiri (2003) uses co-patenting by semiconductor scientists as a measure of intra-firm linkages. Presumably, having researchers from different countries collaborate on the same project not only signals the firm's strong inter-unit coordination but also promotes future knowledge flows within the firm (Singh, 2008) .
Based on the above discussion, we argue that inter-unit collaboration and knowledge flow within firms can encourage communication and coordination, thus improving the effectiveness of corporate budgeting decisions in large organizations. In the next section, we describe the empirical setup and the key variables used to test this relationship.
MODEL AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Marginal q
Firms derive incremental value from each investment they make, and if the capital markets are well-informed, this change in firm assets should be reflected in contemporaneous changes in the firm's market value. Due to diminishing returns to investment, the firm may eventually have a marginal investment project whose incremental value exactly equals the incremental cost.
Optimally, the firm should stop right here.
Marginal q is defined as the ratio of the unanticipated incremental firm market value divided by the contemporaneous marginal investment. Therefore, the value-maximizing capital budgeting decision would yield a marginal q of 1.0: a positive (negative) deviation of a firm's estimated marginal q from 1.0 indicates under-(over-) investment. Of course, exogenous factors such as taxes may affect the capital budgeting process such that the optimal benchmark marginal q may differ from the theoretical benchmark of 1.0.
The methodology to calculate marginal q was developed by Durnev et al. (2004) and was extended by Greene et al. (2006) . The marginal q of firm i can be defined as:
where V i,t is the market value of firm i at time t, and A i,t is the total assets of firm i at time t. E t-1 is the expectations operator, which uses all information available to the firm at time t-1. We substitute for the expectations operator using , the expected return from owning the firm and disbursements to investors; , the expected level of disbursements from the firm (dividends, share repurchases, and interest expenses); , the rate of expected expenditures on capital goods; and , the expected rate of depreciation of the firm's assets. See the appendix for details of how we estimate the firm's value (V) and assets (A). One caveat of marginal q calculation stems from tax considerations. As explained by Durnev et al. (2004) , the marginal investor in a firm may face capital gains taxes, T CG , upon selling shares in the firm, and personal income taxes, T D , upon receiving dividends from the firm.
Thus, instead of [1], the marginal q to such an investor should be
. Using this definition, we obtain [3], which is analogous to [2] .
Thus, the estimated marginal will be 
Efficiency of Capital Budgeting and Internal Information Sharing
We use four complementary measures to proxy for firms' internal information sharing.
Because we emphasize the overall organizational capabilities of firms, each firm -including all its branches and subsidiaries -is treated as an integrated organization.
Our first measure is the self-citation ratio. Trajtenberg et al. (1997) proposed the selfcitation measure, defined as "the percentage of citing patents issued to the same assignee as that of the originating patent," to measure the "fraction of the benefits captured by the original inventor." To capture information flows across locations, we also use the non-local self-citation ratio, a specific variation of the self-citation measure that tracks the percentage of cross-regional citations within the firm.
Third, to capture the importance of interactions among researchers at multiple locations, we measure cross-regional collaborations, the extent of R&D collaborations across units or geographic locations. The fourth and related measure of internal information sharing is examiner-imposed self-citations. In a patent application, the inventors are required to report any prior art that the current patent is based on, and then the patent examiner -who is usually an expert in a certain technological area -would impose other citations that he/she believes appropriate. While an inventor may choose not to cite a competitor's patents for strategic reasons where X represents the four alternative variables used to measure internal linkages, and C represents the firm-level control variables. I SIC are industry fixed effects that capture each firm's primary two-digit SIC code. Finally, we assume that the disturbance term, i ε , is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance σ 2 . As in Greene et al. (2006) , we use a Saxonhouse (1976) technique to weigh all observations by the inverse of the standard error associated with the estimate of marginal q, then use a weighted truncated regression model to conduct separate examinations of under-and over-investing firms using [4] . As the truncated variance is between 0 and 1, the marginal effect of each variable may be smaller than that of the corresponding coefficient (Greene, 2003) .
DATA AND VARIABLES
In this section, we report our sample and data sources, as well as variable construction.
Details of the marginal q estimation procedure and dataset construction are reported in the appendix.
Data Sample and Sources
To estimate marginal q we must have reliable numbers on a firm's market value and assets.
We use all data that can be matched across three datasets -CRSP/Compustat Merged Database To obtain information on each firm's innovation activity, we first match company names in the Compustat data -which are typically parent companies -to the names in DCA. The purpose is to rely on the affiliation information in DCA to create a 'family tree' for each firm, so that the analyses are conducted at the organizational level, inclusive of all the branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures in which the firm has a decisive stake. Next, we match the names of all family members to the patent assignees as documented by the USPTO. For those firms without a match in DCA, we directly match the firm name from Compustat to the patent assignees as documented by the USPTO.
Several sample filters are used to make sure that the firm's accounting data are stable, and that noisy and extreme values are excluded. Our results are robust to variations in the thresholds.
First, we use only U.S.-headquartered, U.S.-incorporated manufacturing firms (i.e., SIC codes 2000-3999) for which five or more consecutive years of data are available from Compustat.
When Compustat reports a value as 'insignificant' we set it to zero. To avoid duplication, we remove entries for preferred stock, class B stock, and the like by discarding entries whose CRSP CUSIP issue number begins with numbers other than 10 or 11.
Second, several criteria are applied to ensure that the equity market variables are reliable.
We include only firms with tangible assets of at least $1 million to eliminate firms that may not have the financial means to pursue a coordinated R&D strategy. Meanwhile, we exclude all firmyear observations when a firm's stock was traded on fewer than 60 days per year (slightly above the first percentile of the distribution, or roughly one in every four trading days), share price was less than $1, and the estimated average Tobin's Q was above 5.0. Also excluded are firm-year observations in which the firm's value, total assets or tangible assets changed by more than 300% in absolute value.
Finally, a firm is included in the sample if and only if it has at least three patents with the USPTO in a three year period. Note that this step may introduce selection bias in the sense that not all manufacturing firms file patents. However, we decide to take this step for two reasons.
First, innovative firms with significant intellectual assets are the ones facing the most serious coordination challenges. Second, most of the multi-unit firms in the Compustat data are large firms with multiple patents in the sample period, so the threshold is not too discriminating.
This yielded a dataset with 367 firms and with estimates of marginal q that ranged from -0.37 to 4.21. As these extreme estimates of marginal q were both significantly different from the mean and difficult to interpret economically, we chose to exclude from analysis all firms for which the estimated marginal q was more than two standard deviations away from the mean; this cost 22 observations. We also included only those firms for which there were two or more other firms also in their industry as measured using the two-digit SIC industry code; this cost 3 observations. The resultant dataset contains 342 manufacturing firms in 16 two-digit SIC industry codes; all data reported herein are based on this sample of 342 firms.
We follow the Durnev et al. (2004) procedure for constructing marginal q. On average, the mean estimated marginal q is 0.94, suggesting that firms over-invest relative to the theoretical benchmark marginal q, 1.0, but not the theoretical tax-adjusted benchmark marginal q, 0.78 (see Table 1 ). What interests us is the significant variation around the mean (from -0.16 to 2.19), which we try to explain using the degree of information sharing inside the firm.
Following the innovation literature (e.g., Chung and Alcácer, 2002; Singh, 2008 
Measures of Information Sharing
The 342 manufacturing firms in the sample collectively generated 182,203 patents in the sample period, with annual patent output ranging from one to 2,865 for each firm, and the number of locations with R&D activities ranging from one to 55. To calculate the self-citation ratio for each patent in our sample, we pull out all the patents that have cited a focal patent after its grant date, and examine whether the assignees belong to the same firm. The ratio of selfcitations to the total number of citations is considered the self-citation ratio of the focal patent, and is averaged at the firm level. Because we are interested in firms as integrated organizations, any citations among affiliated organizations are considered self-citations. Consistent with the literature, the average self-citation ratio in our sample is 14.0%, and the number drops to 2.4% if we only consider self-citations that occur across intra-firm units located in different regions (i.e., the nonlocal self-citation ratio).
Second, to calculate the percentage of cross-regional collaborations, we rely on the frontpage information on the patent applications to identify the address of every single inventor.
Those patents with inventors from at least two different locations are considered the result of cross-regional collaborations. We then divide the number of such patents by the total number of patents filed by each firm in each year. It turns out that 17.7% of the patents are the result of cross-regional collaborations.
Finally, the variable examiner-imposed self-citations is calculated for a reduced sample of patent citations. Because the information on examiner-imposed vs. inventor-listed citations was not available until January 1, 2001, patents granted before that date are removed from the sample. For each focal patent, we divide the number of examiner-imposed self-citations by the number of all self-citations. 48.0% of the citations are imposed by examiners. Examiner-imposed citations constitute a large percentage among self-citations as well as all citations, but the ratio of examiner-imposed self-citations has a much higher variance across firms. Making sound investment decisions is particularly challenging when the firm's R&D activities are geographically dispersed. Therefore, we also count the number of regions where the firm has innovative activities.
4 Table 1 lists the definitions and univariate statistics for the above-mentioned variables, and Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for these variables. In Table 3 we present the industry composition of firms in the dataset. The best-represented industry is "industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment" (two-digit SIC code 35) with 52 firms.
Control Variables
We include a series of firm-level variables as controls. First, firm size matters. Larger firms are likely to have greater internal financing capabilities, and thus are less constrained by capital when seeking valuable investment projects. However, larger firms tend to face more challenging coordination tasks. They also may have explored most of the profitable investment opportunities and are therefore more likely to over-invest (Jensen, 1986) . Firm size is measured as the log of average property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over the time period. Because we are examining innovating firms, we also use the logarithm of the total number of patents that a firm filed in the past three years to reflect its overall innovation clout. 5 We also use the average number of citations received by each patent to reflect the importance of each patent generated by a firm to all patents developed thereafter, even if by other firms.
Second, firms' financial conditions also may affect their budgeting decisions. Firms with high cash flow may be more prone to over-invest (Jensen, 1986) , while firms with low cash flow may conserve resources for future usage (Himmelberg et al., 2002) . Cash flow is measured as the ratio of the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization to tangible assets. We also control for leverage, which is measured as the ratio of the sum of longterm debt and current liabilities to total assets. While highly leveraged firms may face greater financing constraints, they also may be subject to greater corporate governance oversight and therefore make more value enhancing investments (Jensen, 1986) . 6 In robustness tests we also used liquidity, the ratio of the difference between current assets and current liabilities to tangible assets.
Finally, we control for corporate industrial diversification. Diversified firms are more likely to have stable earnings (Lewellen, 1971) , and are thus more likely to have access to external financing (Durnev et al., 2001) . More diversified firms are also more likely to be cash rich and have internal capital markets of their own (Stein, 1997 ). Yet, more diversified firms are more complex and present greater agency and information asymmetry problems to managers and investors. Firm diversification is measured as the average number of different two-digit segments that are reported in Compustat Industry Segment Data (SSIC2). While this measure is a noisy proxy of firm diversification, it remains the best choice available in many circumstances and is used widely in the literature (e.g., Linck et al., 2008) .
In addition, industry-specific characteristics may cause firms in certain industries to make more or less efficient capital budgeting decisions systematically. Two-digit industry fixed effects, S SIC , are therefore included. Moreover, industry-specific volatility may cause marginal q to be estimated with greater noise in some industries. This concern is addressed through the use of random parameters estimation of marginal q.
RESULTS
We now report our results on whether there is a connection between efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions and internal information sharing through separate examinations of firms that under-and over-invest (Tables 4 and 5 ).
Measures of Internal Coordination and Communication
We first explore the connection between capital budgeting and overall self-citation ratios.
We then zoom in on the self-citations that happen across geographic locations, and use non-local self-citation ratio as our key independent variable. Next, we examine the link between valueenhancing capital budgeting decisions and R&D collaborations among inventors from multiple regions as well as examiner-imposed self-citations. For each of our focal independent variables we run three sets of empirical tests. In each set we examine (1) a baseline model using the focal variable, (2) an expanded version including also the number of locations with patenting activities, and (3) a fuller version in which we also control for the average citations received by each patent.
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While the link between efficient capital budgeting and self-citations is statistically insignificant among firms that under-invest (Table 4 Models 1-3), it is highly significant among firms that over-invest (Table 5 Models 1-3), which suggests that repetitive, wasteful investment is reduced when there is greater information sharing within the firm. The effect of self-citations is not affected by the number of locations where the firm patents or the significance of each patent as captured by average citations.
Non-local self-citations indicate the degree to which innovators within the firm build on technologies developed in other parts of the firm, and higher levels of non-local self-citations could indicate better information sharing. Our examination of over-investing firms reveals that capital budgeting decisions are more effective when a firm has higher levels of non-local self-citations (Table 5 Models 4-6). The result is stronger after we control for the number of locations in the firm. Among under-investing firms we observe a statistically insignificant connection between capital budgeting and non-local self-citations (Table 4 Models 4-6).
Among firms that over-invest, interpersonal collaboration across regions turns out to be an effective means of reducing coordination costs and strengthening information sharing in geographically dispersed organizations (Table 5 Models 7-9). We find that firms make more value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions with higher proportion of R&D conducted in multilocation teams; this directly parallels the results reported earlier for the non-local self-citation ratio. We also find that among firms that under-invest, the efficiency of their capital budgeting decisions is significantly worsened by multi-regional collaboration on patents (Table 4 Models 7-9). This result injects a degree of nuance into how we can interpret our results. It may be the case that extensive cross-regional collaborations, while facilitating information sharing, also limit the subsidiaries' access to local resources or local market opportunities, thus forgoing valuable investments that should have happened. Thus, we see that the multi-region ratio is positive and statistically significant in all tests, among under-and over-investing firms.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the percentage of self-citations imposed by patent examiners is a reverse measure of internal information sharing; it reveals the degree to which innovators are unaware of their colleagues' R&D activities. Since this measure is available only for 2001-onwards, we examine a smaller number of firms in this set of regressions (307 vs. 342 in our other tests). We obtain complementary and consistent results from our baseline and fully interacted models among both under-and over-investing firms: firms make fewer investments when they have higher levels of examiner-imposed self-citations (Tables 4 and 5 , Models 10-12).
This results in less efficient capital budgeting decisions for under-investing firms and more efficient capital budgeting decisions for over-investing firms. In other words, firms that underinvest leave good projects unexplored while firms that over-invest encounter speed bumps and over-invest less.
Control Variables
While geographic dispersion could drive up coordination costs, there is evidence that multinational firms make more efficient capital budgeting decisions 2006) and have stronger managerial skills (Bloom and Van Reenen; 2007a , 2007b . Further, Brown and Medoff (1989) found that larger, more complex firms may be able to recruit and retain higher quality employees. Firms that engage in patenting activity are significantly larger and more complex than non-innovating firms. Thus, it is surprising that there is generally no relationship between the efficiency of a firm's capital budgeting decisions and the number of locations where a firm produces patents.
Firms that develop more innovations may face more information asymmetry between managers and investors, who find it difficult to evaluate effectively the intrinsic value of the firm's innovations. Meanwhile, such firms are more likely to face liquidity constraints since they may have to rely more on internal cash flows to finance investments. We find only limited evidence ( Table 5 ) that firms make more effective capital budgeting decisions when they have more patents.
Firms that develop widely-cited patents tend to be industry leaders because (1) they have the resource to engage in cutting-edge technologies, (2) they are more visible, and (3) they are more aggressive in defending their intellectual property, prompting other firms to cite their patents diligently. On the one hand, such patents may represent the successful completion of larger innovation projects that required greater managerial oversight. On the other hand, such projects could signal the presence of a large bureaucratic organization or managerial hubris which leads the firm to pursue attention-grabbing projects. We find significant evidence that, among firms that under-invest, less effective capital budgeting decisions are associated with higher levels of citations.
Related to this, larger firms may face greater coordination problems, thereby driving a higher degree of inefficient resource allocation. However, among both under-and over-investing firms, we generally observe no relation between the efficacy of corporate capital budgeting decisions and firm size. This evidence suggests that the larger firms may have adequate channels for internal communications but that they are generally neutralized in terms of their ability to spur effective investments or innovation among the firms.
Weaker capital budgeting decisions are consistently and significantly associated with leverage, irrespective of whether the firm under-or over-invests (Tables 4 and 5 ). Thus we conclude that firms are constrained by external monitors who may pose extra levels of oversight.
While leverage may signal the presence of external monitors, higher levels of cash flow may make internal monitors more important. We find that capital budgeting decisions are weakly improved by higher cash flow.
Firms that are diversified may need greater access to external capital markets, thus facing greater external monitoring. Accordingly, we find that investment efficiency and industrial diversification appear to be weakly related, mainly among under-investing firms. Among those firms that over-invest we do not observe a consistent relationship between efficient capital budgeting and industrial diversification. Thus, we conclude that diversification could prove wasteful if a firm engages in repetitive investments or simply have no effect if a firm's tendencies towards repetitive investments are curbed by the greater oversight required by boards at diversified firms.
Other control variables were statistically insignificant in all tests. Hayashi (1982) showed that with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, marginal q and average Q should be equal. If financial markets are efficient then managerial and market valuations of the firm should be comparable and thus average Q would reflect both managerial and market perspectives. We therefore use average Tobin's Q, the ratio of firm market value to firm replacement value, as a proxy for investor valuation of a firm. If the stock markets are efficient -and it seems plausible to believe that they were during the period we examine -then our earlier results regarding the relationship between efficient capital budgeting and innovation activity should be mirrored by stock market evaluations of these firms.
AVERAGE Q -COMPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE
We run four sets of tests of the model
where X represents the four alternative variables used to measure internal linkages, and C represents the firm-level control variables. I SIC are industry fixed effects that capture each firm's primary two-digit SIC code, and P t , a series of year fixed effects, are also included to reflect the economic environment. Finally, we assume that the disturbance term, i ε , is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance σ 2 .
When we conducted our earlier tests where marginal q formed part of the dependent variable, the dependent variable was estimated over years 1…T and independent variables were the average value per firm for the years 0…T-1. Since average Q can be estimated directly for each year, we now can use T observations for each firm in estimating [5] . Our dataset of 342 firms contains 224 under-investing firms and 118 over-investing firms but we use simultaneously all 2,663 observations on these 342 firms when examining variation in average Q.
Our results from estimation of [5] are shown in Table 6 . These results complement and mirror our earlier findings regarding marginal q: firm valuation is higher when firms engage in innovation activity that reflects stronger internal coordination and communication. Thus, average Q is significantly higher when firms cite their own patents, cite patents developed by colleagues in other locations, and develop patents with researchers in multiple locations.
Similarly, average Q is significantly lower when examiner-imposed self-citations are higher.
Average Q is also higher when firms develop patents in more locations, a finding that is consistent with the Morck and Yeung (1991) finding that investors value multinationality.
Investors attach a premium to firms that develop more widely-cited patents, which protect firmspecific knowledge and intangible assets.
CONCLUSION
Firms are increasingly conducting business on a global basis and allocating different segments of their value chain to different geographic locations. The additional agency and information asymmetry problems arising from such organizational structures often make it difficult for managers to make efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions. We focus on firm heterogeneity in the degree of internal information sharing, and examine whether the efficiency of corporate capital budgeting decisions are associated with stronger internal linkages.
Using marginal Tobin's q to measure the efficiency of corporate capital budgeting decisions and four alternative variables to measure firms' internal information sharing, we find consistent evidence that firms with (1) higher internal citations, (2) frequent citations across subsidiaries, (3) extensive use of inter-unit collaborations, and (4) smaller percentage of examiner-imposed self-citations are less likely to under-or over-invest. This is also consistent with Singh (2008), who suggests that cross-unit integrative mechanisms are crucial for achieving superior R&D performance in multi-unit firms.
Admittedly, there may be other factors in firms' capital budgeting decisions that cannot be fully incorporated into this study. For future research, for example, it would be interesting to have a closer look at the benefits and costs of strong internal linkages, and analyze whether firms with different strategic imperatives or cost structures would choose specific levels of inter-unit integration, which, in turn, affects the efficiency of corporate budgeting.
APPENDIX
To estimate V i,t and A i,t , the terms are rewritten as:
where CS i,t = the market value of the outstanding common shares, estimated as the number of common shares outstanding (CRSP's SHROUT) multiplied by the end of fiscal year price (CRSP's PRC).
PS i,t = the estimated market value of preferred shares outstanding (Compustat's Data19) over the Moody's Baa preferred dividend yield.
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LTD i,t = estimated market value of long-term debt (Data9).
SD i,t = book value of short-term debt, estimated as debt in current liabilities (Data34), the total amount of short-term notes and the current portion of long-term debt that is due in one year, less the total amount of short-term notes (Data206).
STA i,t = book value of short-term assets (Data4). STA i,t is included in the estimation of firm assets, A i,t , in order to reflect the possibility of corporate spin-offs or divestitures.
P t = inflation adjustment using the GDP deflator.
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K i,t = estimated market value of property, plant, and equipment, which is calculated using current and historical data on capital spending (Data7).
INV = estimated market value of inventories, calculated using total inventory (Data3) and LIFO reserve (Data240). When a firm uses FIFO accounting, inventory is Data3.
However, when a firm uses LIFO accounting, inventory is Data3 + Data240.
In [3] we estimate D i,t-1 , disbursements to investors, as the product d i,t V i,t-1 , with d
capturing total cash disbursements, which are estimated as the sum of cash dividends on common and preferred stock (Data21 and Data19), purchases of common and preferred stock (Data115), 10 and interest expense (Data15).
The market value of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) is calculated using a recursive algorithm because historical cost accounting does not adjust properly for inflation. All PP&E figures are converted to 1983 dollars, 11 and we assume straight-line depreciation of 10% per annum. PP&E in year t+1 is PP&E from year t less 10% depreciation plus current capital spending, denoted ΔX i,t+1 , which is deflated to 1983 dollars. We convert the data to 1983 dollars using π t , the fractional change in the seasonally adjusted producer price index (PPI) for finished goods published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 12 More generally, we use the recursive equation:
[A3]
When fewer than ten years of historical observations are available per firm, we begin the calculation with the first available year of data. We exclude all firms for which we are unable to obtain at least five historical observations. This procedure is necessary because historical cost accounting can cause firm valuations of PP&E to be inaccurate if simple deflators are used to adjust for inflation.
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